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Kosovo Ð the question 
of final status
Adam Balcer
The Rambouillet conference held in February-
March 1999 and the establishment of an interna-
tional protectorate in June 1999 were breakthro-
ughs in the most recent history of Kosovo, the
former autonomous province of Serbia. These
two events opened the debate on KosovoÕs final
status. If it were regulated, one of EuropeÕs most
difficult problems would be solved.
Historical background 
of the problem
Kosovo is home to one third of the 6.3 million-
strong Albanian nation. Its population accounts
for 70 percent of Albanians living outside Alba-
nia. Albanians presently account for over 90 per-
cent of the regionÕs population. If we include
non-Albanian (mostly Serbian) refugees who live
outside Kosovo but retain their voting rights,
this percentage is slightly lower: approx. 83 per-
cent1. AlbaniaÕs borders with Kosovo, Montene-
gro and Macedonia are located in areas predomi-
nantly inhabited by Albanians. Most of the re-
maining 30 percent of Albanians living outside
Albania inhabit areas in the close vicinity of Ko-
sovo, such as North Macedonia and the Preseva
Valley. In the neighbouring countries, Albanians
form large minorities (e.g. they account for ap-
prox. 25 percent of MacedoniaÕs population).
Kosovo has played an immensely important role
in the history of Serbia. At the time of Ser-
biaÕs greatest power, it was the centre of state
and church authority. It was also the scene of the
battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the leitmotiv of
Serbian national mythology. Enormously impor-
tant to SerbiaÕs national identity2, Kosovo beca-
me the object of a long and fierce Serbian-Alba-
nian conflict, which further exacerbated after
World War II owing to higher birth rates among
the Albanians and the increased emigration of
Serbs from Kosovo.
It is extremely difficult to solve the Serbian-Alba-
nian conflict because the interests of the two si-
des differ radically. Since the 19th century, the
two nations have been aspiring to form Great Al-
bania and Great Serbia, i.e. states uniting all Al-
banians and all Serbs respectively. After Kosovo
was incorporated into Serbia, Albanians began
armed attempts to unite it with Albania. Before
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1945, Belgrade refused to recognise the Albanian
national minority. KosovoÕs autonomy was im-
posed on the Serbs following World War II aga-
inst their will by Yugoslav communists. It was
expanded considerably in 1968Ð1974. Under the
1974 constitution introduced by Marshal Josip
Broz Tito, Kosovo remained an autonomous re-
gion within Serbia, but it was granted a broad
autonomy (the status of a federal unit3). At the
same time, Albanians as a nationality (a national
minority) were recognised as equal to the other
Yugoslav nations. However, unlike the republics
of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and the other Serbian au-
tonomous province Ð Voivodina had no right to
secession. In terms of practical policy, Koso-
voÕs position within the federal system was we-
aker also than that of the republics. The Alba-
niansÕ most popular idea was to demand the sta-
tus of a nation equal to Òthe republican nationsÓ
and to transform Kosovo into a republic4. Serbs,
on the other hand, generally opposed the status
granted to Kosovo under the 1974 constitution,
seeing it as the first step towards the provin-
ceÕs secession5.
The 1974 constitution dissatisfied both Alba-
nians and Serbs, which led to the outbreak of
ethnic conflict in the 1980s (following TitoÕs de-
ath). As a result, Slobodan Milosevic came to po-
wer in Belgrade and KosovoÕs autonomy was si -
gnificantly restricted (1989/1990). The break-up
of Yugoslavia in 1991 inclined Albanians to give
up seeking solutions while remaining within
Yugoslavia, in favour of aspirations for indepen-
dence. For a short time, it breathed new life into
the idea of a Great Albania6. Even though many
Albanians considered it to be an ideal solution,
this concept never became very popular due to
firm objection on the part of the West. This is
why, following the declaration of KosovoÕs inde-
pendence in October 1991, Albanians represen-
ted the declaration of independence as a com-
promise between the Great Albania idea and the
provinceÕs continued existence within Serbia 7.
The West refused to recognise KosovoÕs declara-
tion of independence. It was believed that the
optimum solution was to restore the pre-1989 si-
tuation or, in the maximum variant, to trans-
form Kosovo into a third republic within Yugo-
slavia. Faced with this attitude, Ibrahim Rugo-
vaÕs Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the do -
minant party on KosovoÕs political scene in
1989Ð1998, at times sought compromise with
Belgrade, agreeing to abandon aspirations for
the provinceÕs independence8. These efforts we-
re futile, though, because Milosevic and a large
majority of Serbs rejected the option to restore
the pre-1989 situation9.
The Serb opposition came up with two plans: 
1. to divide Kosovo into two sections; a Serbian
and an Albanian and, in the case of any border
changes in the Balkans, to annex the former di-
rectly to Serbia, 
2. the cantonisation of Kosovo10. These solutions
were unacceptable to Albanians because of Ko-
sovoÕs ethnic map (the areas with Serbian majo-
rities were largely dispersed and island-like). The
failure of RugovaÕs policy led to the formation of
an armed alternative, the Kosovo Liberation Ar-
my (UCK), which started a guerrilla war at the
end of 1997. Initially, UCK backed the Great Alba-
nia idea, but soon limited it to the independen-
ce of Kosovo.
As the rebellion broke out, the West became in-
volved with Kosovo for the first time Ð a deve-
lopment that could not have been attained using
peaceful means. In 1998, US mediators put for-
ward a number of peace plans for Kosovo, all of
which suggested that its autonomy should be
considerably extended. These plans ranged from
the restoration of the 1974Ð1989 status of the
region to the factual transformation of Kosovo
into a third republic. However, both Belgrade
and UCK rejected the plans. A breakthrough in
the history of the Serbian-Albanian clash over
Kosovo came with the Rambouillet conference in
FebruaryÐMarch 1999. The Albanians skilfully
used the uncompromising, anti-West policy of
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, winning
the WestÕs approval for discussions about inde-
pendence for the first time. The final document
of the conference included a provision that the
final status of Kosovo would be determined in
three yearsÕ time. This way, it did not explicitly
preclude any solution. KosovoÕs final status was
to be determined by an international conference
based on Òthe will of the peopleÓ, the opinions of
Òauthoritative expertsÓ and provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act (which permits border chan-
ges exclusively with the consent of both intere-
sted parties). For UCK, accepting the Rambouillet
decisions meant a silent consent to the possibi-
lity that they might have to give up their inde-
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pendence aspirations. The Serbian side rejected
the Rambouillet agreement 11 and started a new
offensive in Kosovo, the aim of which was to cle-
anse parts of the province of Albanians. This was
probably done with a perspective to subsequen-
tly divide Kosovo, and ultimativly it caused NA-
TOÕs bombing of Yugoslavia. In response, Milose-
vic initiated ethnic cleansing on a huge scale 12,
accompanied by massacres of civilians. After
two and a half months of bombings, Belgrade
agreed to withdraw troops from Kosovo and
transform the province into a protectorate. Un-
der Resolution 1244, passed by the UN Security
Council on 10 June 1999, Kosovo became an in-
ternational protectorate while de iure remaining
an integral part of Yugoslavia until the final de-
cision on its status is taken. Resolution 1244 did
not state exactly when such decision should be
taken, unlike the Rambouillet final document,
which established a three-year transition period.
Compared to the Rambouillet decisions, the pro-
visions of Resolution 1244 on KosovoÕs final sta-
tus were less rigorous and allowed ample room
for interpretation. The resolution provided that,
when taking the final decision, the international
community would Òtake into accountÓ the conc-
lusions of the Rambouillet conference. Meanwhi-
le, the Security Council was to extend the pro-
tectorate every 12 months until the final status
of Kosovo were determined. Resolution 1244 pla-
ced more emphasis on the preservation of Yugo-
slaviaÕs territorial integrity13. However, unlike
the Rambouillet document, it minimised Belgra-
deÕs influence on the situation in Kosovo (e.g.
the absence of Serb police forces and Yugoslav
troops). 
Development of autonomous 
institutions 
Under Resolution 1244, the United Nations obli-
ged itself to establish institutions for the Ko s o v o
p rotectorate and gradually transfer authority to
the locals. In theory, Resolution 1244 obliged the
international community to implement the deta-
iled decisions of the Rambouillet confere n c e ,
which precisely defined the pro t e c t o r a t e Õ s g o-
vernment system. In re a l i t y, however, the system
developed after 1999 differed substantially fro m
that projected by the Rambouillet final document.
Shortly after KFOR entered Kosovo, the interna-
tional community created a local administration
under its control and, in July 1999, established
the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), which
played an exclusively advisory role. An impor-
tant concession made by the United Nations to
Albanians was the consent to transform the Ko-
sovo Liberation Army (UCK) into the Kosovo Pro-
tection Corps (KPC/TMK), a kind of civil guard,
which the Albanians treated as a back-bone of
their future army. The formation of KPC/TMK
had not been envisaged either in the Rambouil-
let conference document or in Resolution 1244.
The Disarmament of the UCK, which was one of
the conditions of Resolution 1244, was imple-
mented only in part, because not all weapons
were delivered to the KFOR.
In December 1999, the international civil admi-
nistration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) signed an
agreement with Albanian parties considerably
expanding the composition of the KTC and esta-
blishing the Interim Administrative Council
( I AC), a quasi government subordinated to
UNMIK. In November 2000, self-governmental
elections were held. In May 2001, following con-
sultations with Albanians and Serbs, UNMIK ad-
opted the Constitutional Framework, which ca-
me into force as of the date parliamentary elec-
tions were held in November 2001. This new law
established the presidentÕs office and a govern-
ment whose competencies included the econo-
my (including foreign trade14), health care, infra-
structure, public administration and education.
The UNMIK chief was supposed to gradually
transfer most of his competencies in the econo-
mic sphere to local authorities. This process
commenced in early April 2003 and was imme-
diately criticised by the Serbs as being prematu-
re. The Albanians, on the other hand, were dissa-
tisfied with the absence of a guarantee that the
other competencies reserved for the head of
UNMIK would be transferred as well. 
UNMIK retained control over foreign policy, bor-
der protection, security structures, and the re-
turn process of non-Albanian refugees. It also re-
tained the right to veto all major decisions of the
parliament and government. This way, it could
prevent a unilateral declaration of independence
by the parliament. The Constitutional Frame-
work obligated the UNMIK chief to co-operate
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with local authorities in the scope of foreign po-
licy and border control15. As regards the admini-
stration of justice, the UNMIK chief retained full
control over international judges and the appo-
intments and dismissals of local judges and pro-
secutors. The competencies of the local authori-
ties included nominations of candidates for jud-
ges and the administrative aspect of the opera-
tion of courts and prosecutorsÕ offices. In April
2002, UNMIK decided to gradually increase the
number of local judges, expand their powers
and reduce the roles of international judges to
an auxiliary role. 
This gradual transfer of competencies was part of
the international communityÕ s strategy known as
Ò S t a n d a rds Before StatusÓ. Under this strategy, di-
scussions on the final status of Kosovo may only
commence once certain conditions have been
met. The ÒStandards Before StatusÓ strategy was
formulated in April 2002 by Michael Steiner, Head
of UNMIK. Its conditions included:
Ð the development of a democratic system based
on the rule of law; 
Ð the return of non-Albanian refugees;
Ð integration of non-Albanians into a multi-eth-
nic society;
Ð the solution of economic problems and regula-
tion of the property issue; 
Ð the commencement of direct talks between
Pristina and Belgrade on technical matters; 
Ð KPC/TMK reform. 
In autumn 1999 the local Kosovo Police Service
(KPS) was established within the security struc-
tures. It co-operates with UNMIK police and re-
ports to the head of the UN mission. The KPS for-
ce is being increased systematically, while, at the
same time, the international police contingent is
being downsized. Towards the end of 1999 KPS,
alongside the international police, began to con-
trol KosovoÕs border crossings, including those
with Serbia and Montenegro. UNMIK is also im-
plementing the strategy of gradual take over of
the managerial functions in the police force by
Kosovo officers. This process will be concluded
in 2005, when a Kosovo officer is to become
chief of the entire police force. 
In late December 2002, the Serbian daily D a n a s d a-
ily published a plan for the re s t ructuring of
KPC/TMK pre p a red by US experts at the request of
the National Security Council. The plan states that:
Ð the force should be downsized; 
Ð KPC/TMK should become more involved in en-
suring security, e.g. by demining;
Ð KPC/TMK should co-operate with NATO with
the intention to participate in peace missions;
Ð a new institution; the Kosovo Council for Secu-
rity and Public Order, should be established wi-
thin UNMIK to control KPC/TMK and the conside-
rably enlarged KPS. 
US authorities stated that this was not an offi-
cial government plan, but they emphasised the
need to reform KPC/TMK. The project came un-
der severe criticism in Serbia, which saw it as
the first step towards the formation of a Kosovo
army. Albanians criticised it as well, because
they opposed the downsizing of the Corps. 
The KPC/TMK reform is linked with the
UNMIKÕs plan to eliminate radicals and persons
linked with the underworld. KFOR had assumed
an overly passive approach towards KPC/TMK
and UCK, creating conditions that allowed the
members of these formations to take part in re-
bellions in Presevo Valley and Macedonia. In
2001Ð2002, UNMIK either dismissed or brought
about the arrest of, and high imprisonment sen-
tences for, more than a dozen KPC/TMK officers.
In June 2001, more than a dozen prominent for-
mer UCK members were blacklisted (declared
personae non gratae) by the EU and the US. 
The Constitutional Framework included no di-
rect reference to YugoslaviaÕs territorial integrity
in the transition period or even to the provisions
of the Helsinki Final Act. However, it did include
a provision that the future status of Kosovo sho-
uld be determined in accordance with Resolu-
tion 1244, Òtaking into full accountÓ all appro-
priate factors, including the will of the people
(the only factor named explicitly). Compared to
Resolution 1244, the Constitutional Framework
placed more emphasis on the need to hold a re-
ferendum but, unlike the Rambouillet document,
it specified neither the exact date of such refe-
rendum, nor the date on which talks about the
final status should begin. This absence of a date
for the referendum dissatisfied Albanians. The
Serbs, on the other hand, fiercely criticised the
absence of an explicit provision on Yugosla-
viaÕs territorial integrity (in the context of the
Kosovo issue). Subsequent statements by the
UNMIK chief and EU and US politicians and, to
a smaller degree, the conclusion of the agre-
ement with Belgrade in November 2001, showed
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clearly that Resolution 1244, and not the Consti-
tutional Framework, is the document of primary
importance for the international community.
After three years, the results of the policy imple-
mented by UNMIK and new local authorities de-
serve some degree of criticism, but without go-
ing to extremes. Kosovo faces the serious pro-
blem of high unemployment and a very large
group of people living below the poverty level16.
The difficulties experienced by KosovoÕs econo-
my are visible e.g. in the frequent interruptions
of the water and electricity supply. However,
there are also some positive trends. Small enter-
prises are developing and trade is on a good
track, a modern tax system has been introduced
and tax collectibility is improving systematically.
However, a decisive improvement in the econo-
mic situation will not take place as long as the
issue of KosovoÕs final status remains unreso-
lved. Solving this matter would help Kosovo at-
tract foreign investments and contract credits.
As regards Western investments, it is particular-
ly important to regulate property rights. This
process was initiated with the regulation issued
by the head of UNMIK on 9 may 2003 on the sta-
tus of former state property, which made it po-
ssible to start the privatisation process. Another
serious problem is corruption. Finally, the parlia-
ment works slowly. Faced with KosovoÕs unreso-
lved status, it spends too much time preparing
symbolic resolutions intended to bring closer
the prospect KosovoÕs independence, while it do-
es nothing to improve the difficult economic si-
tuation of the protectorate17.
Ever since KFOR entered Kosovo, the security si-
tuation has been improving systematically. This
manifests itself, for example, in an evident de-
crease in the number of murders. However, con-
tinuing problems include: 
Ð organised crime linked with political circles; 
Ð politically motivated assassinations18;
Ð low crime detection rate owing to the poor
functioning of the witness protection system. 
Kosovo has also become an important location
on the routes of drug and cigarette smuggling,
illegal immigration and human trafficking. 
The concept of a m u l t i - e t h n i c
Ko s o v o
Since the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, the in-
ternational community has officially stuck to the
concept of a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which non-
Albanians would be treated as equal to the Alba-
nian majority, and not as national minorities in
an Albanian Ko s o v o. The implicit assumption un-
derlying this idea was that territorial divisions
and population exchanges are not to be accepted. 
It is difficult to estimate KosovoÕs ethnic structu-
re. According to the most recent and most relia-
ble UN estimates, 230 thousand non-Albanians
presently inhabit Kosovo, and around 240 tho-
usand refugees live beyond its borders19. Toge-
ther, they account for approx. 17 percent of Ko-
sovoÕs population. When serious debates on the
final status of Kosovo begin, there may emerge
the problem of the citizenship of thousands of
Albanians and non-Albanians who left Kosovo
before the outbreak of fighting in 1998, frequen-
tly due to discrimination, and have not returned
to date20. The significance of non-Albanians in
Kosovo becomes even more important if one re-
members that before 1998 territories with
a non-Albanian ethnic majority accounted for
approx. 25 percent of KosovoÕs territory21. The
Rambouillet conference proposed a system of
multi-ethnic democracy for Kosovo in which, for
example, one third of seats in the parliament
would be reserved for non-Albanians. The Con-
stitutional Framework guaranteed 17 percent of
seats in the parliament to non-Albanians, and it
also envisaged the option to vote for candidates
from outside the guaranteed quota. As a result,
nearly 30 percent of MPs (holding 35 seats) 
in the Kosovo Parliament are non-Albanian. This
percentage would be even higher, if not for the
low turnouts of Serbs. Over the one and a half
years of his rule, Prime Minister of Kosovo, Baj-
ram Rexhepi, has substantially increased the
number of non-Albanian officials working in go-
vernment institutions. However, non-Albanians
continue to account for a negligible percentage
of employees working for major state-owned en-
terprises. On the local level, non-Albanian villa-
ges, especially those inhabited by Serbs, are
frequently discriminated against by self-govern-
ment authorities as regards finances and admi-
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nistration. Under pressure from UNMIK, this si-
tuation began to improve in 2003. 
The still smouldering Serbian-Albanian conflict
is a major obstacle to the implementation of the
multi-ethnic Kosovo concept. After 1999, tho-
usands of non-Albanians fled from Kosovo for fe-
ar of the AlbaniansÕ revenge, which claimed
hundreds of lives22. As a result, most of Kosovo
Serbs and Romas are staying outside Kosovo for
the moment. Serbian enclaves have formed in
Kosovo, and they offer refuge to some of the
Serbs who used to live dispersed in other re-
gions of the province. In the largest of these enc-
laves, Serbs have expelled most Albanians by
force or prevented refugees, who had fled at the
time of ethnic cleansing during the NATO bom-
bings, from returning to their homes. The posi-
tion of Albanians living under Serb ÒruleÓ is ve-
ry much like the situation of small Serbian Òeth-
nic islandsÓ in regions populated predominantly
by Albanians. The most important of these enc-
laves is Kosovska Mitrovica, a region that bor-
ders Serbia directly23. After 1999, this enclave be-
came an actual part of Serbia: Serbian state insti-
tutions were preserved there and were not repla-
ced by UNMIK structures, which was contrary to
the provisions of Resolution 1244. Even today,
the Serbian government continues to have offi-
cials in other parts of Kosovo as well. 
The number of attacks on Serbs has gradually
decreased, owing to the progressive shrinking of
their population, their concentration in the enc-
laves and KFORÕs intensified security efforts24.
Nevertheless, the situation of Serbs in Kosovo is
still unsatisfactory, e.g. their freedom of move-
ment is restricted25, and they continue to be tre-
ated as second-class citizens 26.
The fundamental precondition of success of the
refugeesÕ return process is the affirmative attitu-
de of the Albanian majority. However, Albanian-
Serbian resentment remains strong, and the sta-
tus of Kosovo is still indeterminate. As a result,
despite the fact that a decisive majority of Alba-
nians say they support the return of refugees,
many of them fear that, in practice, this could je-
opardise KosovoÕs independence aspirations. On-
ly less than three percent of refuges have retur-
ned so far, although the number of returning
persons has been increasing steadily since 1999.
The very organisation of the refugeesÕ return is
a point of contention. Albanians and UNMIK be-
lieve that returns should be an evolutionary pro-
cess and that refugees should come back to the-
ir former homes. The Serbian side, on the other
hand, promotes mass returns, mainly to Serbian
enclaves. Albanians perceive this as an attempt
to prepare the division of Kosovo.
In order to encourage Serbs to vote, Hans Haek-
kerup, then Head of UNMIK, signed an agre-
ement with Nebojsa Covic, Serbian Deputy Pri-
me Minister, in November 2001. The agreement
reaffirmed the primacy of Resolution 1244 over
the Constitutional Framework, and assure d
Serbs that the number of their representatives in
the justice system and the police would be incre-
ased, that the process of refugee returns would
be hastened, that curricula developed in Belgra-
de would be introduced to Serbian schools and
that the number of international judges would
be doubled. However, this agreement was imple-
mented only in part.
In July 2002, the new UNMIK chief Michael Ste-
iner and a representative of Belgrade, signed an
agreement on the inclusion of Serbian judges in-
to the Kosovo administration of justice. It was
implemented in December 200227. Towards the
end of November 2002, Steiner concluded an
agreement with Covic on the gradual integra-
tion of the Mitrovica region with UNMIK structu-
res. The process projected by this agreement
was frozen in February 2003 when Mitrovica be-
came the focus of the SerbsÕ efforts to divide Ko-
sovo. In 2003, a self-government reform (decen-
tralisation) prepared by the Council of Europe is
to be implemented.
The multi-ethnic Kosovo concept is linked to the
issue of direct talks between Pristina and Belgra-
de on strictly technical matters, which UNMIK
hopes will help build mutual confidence. Howe-
ver, both sides approach these talks with cau-
tion because of the radical differences in their
views on the key question of KosovoÕs future sta-
tus28. These talks were scheduled to commence
in March 2003, but they did not take place be-
cause of the assassination of Serbian Prime Mini-
ster Zoran Djindjic. Besides, those Albanians
who wanted to reaffirm the separation between
Kosovo and Serbia are much more interested in
talks with Kosovo Serbs, without BelgradeÕs me-
diation.
In May 2003 Hashim Thaci, the former UCK le-
ader, extended a proposal of dialogue to Kosovo
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Serbs, but his offer was rejected after the Ko s o v o
Parliament passed the declaration honouring the
Kosovo peopleÕs long struggle for independence. 
Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs 
Before Milosevic lost power in October 2000, Bel-
gradeÕs policy had been resolvedly anti-Western.
In the relations with UNMIK, this policy had
a destructive impact (supporting Serbian encla-
ves in Kosovo). The new democratic government
in Belgrade, which succeeded Milosevic in Octo-
ber 2000, adopted a two-way strategy: on the
one hand, it continued to support parallel struc-
tures that were independent of UNMIK (especial-
ly in the enclave of Kosovska Mitrovica) and, on
the other, it tried to include Serbs into the main-
stream of political life in return for certain con-
cessions made by the UN. 
One of the most significant moves made by Ser-
bian authorities, which aimed to co-ordinate the
Serbian policy towards Kosovo, was the establi-
shment, on 3 July 2001, of the Co-ordination
Centre for Kosovo and Metohija. The Centre was
chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic,
who earned his position of authority by solving
the conflict in the Presevo Valley (on the Serbian-
Kosovo border) in 2001. For some time, Serbian
authorities hoped that the success Presevo Vallin
move would persuade UNMIK to allow the gra-
dual expansion of BelgradeÕs influence on the si-
tuation in Kosovo.
The most important manifestation of Serbian
pragmatism was the formation of the Return Co-
alition that took part in the parliamentary elec-
tions of November 2001. However, this strategy
was criticised by many Kosovo Serbs, who oppo-
sed integration with UNMIK and followed the
tactic of boycotting the protectorateÕs institu-
tions. 
Faced with Albanian pro-independence efforts
and compromises reached by UNMIK and the Ko-
sovo Albanians leading to the expansion of the
competencies of local authorities, the Return Co-
alition also resorted to boycotting administrati-
ve structures established by UNMIK as a weapon
in its political struggle29.
Belgrade attempted to play a role in Kosovo in
several different ways, but these attempts frequ-
ently ended with spectacular fiascos as UNMIK
in spite of BelgradeÕs protests took decisions
against SerbiaÕs will. Typical examples of this in-
cluded the commencement, in April 2003, of the
transfer of competencies to local authorities,
and Michael SteinerÕs regulation authorising pri-
vatisation of former state-owned property in Ko-
sovo issued on 9 May 2003 (Belgrade considered
these state-owned assets to be Serbian proper-
ty). Aware of its limited influence, Belgrade so-
metimes accepts the reality that is imposed on
it. For example, in July 2002, it established bor-
der crossings with Kosovo on the Serbian side of
the border.
While Belgrade recognises Resolution 1244, it
obviously interprets it in line with its own inte-
rests. It claims that the Kosovo area de iure re m a-
ins part of Yugoslav territory. Serbian authorities
have emphasised this re p e a t e d l y, e.g. by signing
an agreement on the delimitation of bord e r s
with Macedonia in Fe b ru a ry 2001 (the agre e m e n t
pertained to the Macedonian-Kosovo section of
the border as well) or by including Kosovo Alba-
nians in turnout calculations during pre s i d e n t i a l
elections in Serbia. The constitution of Serbia and
M o n t e n e g ro, crafted for months and which was
finally adopted on 4 Fe b ru a ry 2003, was also an
important element in this strategy. The constitu-
t i o nÕ s p reamble includes a p rovision that Ko s o v o
is an autonomous province of Serbia, temporari-
ly under the control of the United Nations3 0. 
In Belgrade, the project to solve the Kosovo pro-
blem by dividing the province into a Serbian and
an Albanian section is gaining popularity. Were
it carried out, the Serbian section would be in-
corporated directly into Serbia, and the Albanian
part, with a very broad autonomy, would rema-
in an international protectorate. This way, the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) would be preserved. Another va-
riant of this concept is to radically alter borders
based on ethnic criteria throughout the region.
The former project once again became the sub-
ject of public debate in May 2001 when work on
the Constitutional Framework was about to be
finished in Kosovo. At that time, Serbian Deputy
Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic put forward the
concept of dividing Kosovo. CovicÕs deputy in the
Co-ordination Council and his chief advisor was
the town planner Branislav Krstic, the leading
ideologist of the concept to divide Ko s o v o,
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which he discussed in his book Kosovo pred su-
dom istorije (Belgrade, 2000)31. The international
community has sometimes tried to take into ac-
count some demands of Serbs regarding the di-
vision of Kosovo along ethnic lines. Before the lo-
cal elections in October 2002, the UNMIK chief
promised Serbs that a self-government reform
would be carried out allowing non-Albanians to
establish special administrative units with bro-
ad competencies within communes in areas po-
pulated by non-Albanian majorities, if they vo-
ted in large numbers during the elections. The
turnouts were low, however, and this project
was postponed until a later date. At the mo-
ment, a new self-government reform project pre-
pared by the Council of Europe is in the pipeline.
In January 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran
Djindjic told Der Spiegel32 that if Kosovo Alba-
nians continued to push for independence, Bel-
grade would call for a new ÒDayton conferenceÓ
to establish new borders based on ethnic crite-
ria. Djindjic made it clear that he meant a divi-
sion of Kosovo, incorporation the Serbian parts
of Kosovo into Serbia and the inclusion of the
Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia into Serbia, in re-
turn for the separation of the Albanian part of
Kosovo from the federation of Serbia and Monte-
negro. This statement was criticised fiercely by
the US and the EU and Djindjic finally withdrew
his proposal claiming that his objective was to
win the backing of the international community
for the preservation of YugoslaviaÕs territorial
integrity, identical to that enjoyed by Bosnia.
A week later, he called for direct talks to be held
with the Albanian side, Kosovo Serb leaders and
the international community in order to deter-
mine the future status of Kosovo. Djindjic justi-
fied his proposal with the policy of faits accom-
plis allegedly pursued by the international com-
munity, which led to the formation of a de facto
independent state in Kosovo33.
The talks were scheduled to start in June 2003.
The Serbian Prime MinisterÕs p roposal was criti-
cised by the EU and the US, which maintained
that talks on the final status of Kosovo should
not commence until certain conditions were met,
in keeping with the ÒStandards Before StatusÓ
s t r a t e g y. On 20 January, Kosovo Serbs pro c l a i m e d
the formation of the Union of the Serbian Com-
munes of Kosovo and Metohija3 4 and, a week la-
t e r, the UnionÕ s re p resentatives met Djindjic in
Belgrade. At that time, a ÒcovertÓ joint action
strategy was adopted, which projected the deve-
lopment of Serbian stru c t u res within Ko s o v o. The
p roclamation establishing the Union made it clear
that the deepest concession the Kosovo Serbs
would be ready to make was the acceptance of
the secession of the Albanian part of Ko s o v o3 5. 
On 1 February, Djindjic demanded in a letter to
Admiral Gregory Johnson, commander of NATO
forces in South Eastern Europe, that the Yugo-
slav army and Serbian police units be allowed to
return to Kosovo in numbers authorised by Reso-
lution 1244. The same demand was included in
the letter sent on 7 February to UN Secretary Ge-
neral Kofi Annan. The international community
rejected DjindjicÕs initiative, emphasising that
the only armed force authorised in Kosovo was
KFOR and that the resolution only mentioned
the return of army and police personnel, and not
armed units. In his response on 22 February,
Djindjic said that if the West refused to allow the
return of Serbian forces to Kosovo, Belgrade wo-
uld back the formation of a Serbian mini-state in
Kosovo36. Three days later, the Union of Serbian
Communes of Kosovo and Metohija proclaimed
the formation of its own parliament and passed
a declaration on KosovoÕs territorial integrity wi-
thin Serbia. This declaration also provided that
Serbian enclaves within Kosovo should be con-
nected by special corridors and that they should
maintain close ties with Serbia in terms of edu-
cation, the welfare system, health care and secu-
rity. On 29 February, Djindjic stated in an inte-
rview for the Serbian newspaper Vesti that Koso-
vo should be transformed into a Serbian-Alba-
nian federation similar to the Muslim-Croatian
federation in Bosnia (the canton system) and re-
main part of Serbia, enjoying a status higher
than that of an autonomy, but lower than that of
federal units (Serbia and Montenegro)37. This
meant that Kosovo would be granted an autono-
my broader than that of Voivodina, but smaller
than the one it had in communist Yugoslavia
(1974Ð1989). However, because of the assassina-
tion of Djindjic and SerbiaÕs internal problems
linked to the struggle against organised crime,
the Serbian offensive in Kosovo had to slow
down. 
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Kosovo Albanians and Albania 
Ever since KFOR entered Kosovo, the main goals
of Kosovo Albanians have been to hasten the
process of transferring competencies to local au-
thorities and to hold talks on the final status of
Kosovo as soon as possible. The weak point of
the Albanian policy, which limited its effective-
ness, was the deep division of the political scene
between Hashim ThaciÕs Democratic Party of Ko-
sovo (PDK) and Ramush HaradinajÕs Alliance for
the Future of Kosovo (AAK) (groups originating
from the UCK), on the one hand, and Ibrahim Ru-
govaÕs Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), on
the other. Unlike the former two, the latter gro-
up sought the legitimisation of KosovoÕs inde-
pendence in the events of the early 1990s, cla-
iming that Kosovo had already proclaimed inde-
pendence and now it only needed to seek inter-
national recognition. The passing, in May this
year, of the common parliamentary resolution of
the three parties, honouring all forms of the Al-
banian peopleÕs struggle for independence in
the 1990s, was of historical importance and
marked the first step towards bridging these di-
visions.
Following the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops
from Kosovo, Albanians initially tried to pursue
a policy of faits accomplis to bring closer the
prospect of independence. In June 1999, Hashim
ThaciÕs government took advantage of the inter-
regnum that followed the withdrawal of Yugo-
slav troops, and immediately appointed mayors
to nearly all the communes except for the three
that formed the Serbian enclave north of Mitro-
vica. Under pressure from the international com-
munity, Thaci subsequently approved the self-
government authorities appointed by UNMIK. In
order to ensure that independence remains a pu-
blicly debated issue, Albanians sometimes took
measures that were sure to provoke criticism
from the international community. For example,
on 15 May 2003, the MPs of all Albanian parties
and representatives of non-Serb nationalities
passed a symbolic resolution Òhonouring Koso-
voÕs long struggle for national independenceÓ38.
The official declarations of the Albanian side fre-
quently differed from the policies actually pursu-
ed. An example of this was the involvement of
members of the Kosovo Protection Corps, a force
linked to parties originating from the UCK, in
the rebellion in Macedonia condemned by the
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Western
pressure. 
Albanians firmly oppose any agreements conclu-
ded with Belgrade by the neighbouring coun-
tries or UNMIK, which relate to Kosovo but have
not been consulted with the Albanian side. One
of the reasons for the increased activity of the
Albanian guerrillas in the Presevo Valley in No-
vember 2000 was the fear that democratic Bel-
grade might become UNMIKÕs chief partner39.
On 23 May 2002, the parliament of Kosovo pas-
sed a resolution declaring that the agreement on
the delimitation of borders concluded in Febru-
ary 2001 between Serbia and Macedonia was vo-
id. The head of the UN mission immediately ve-
toed this resolution but, at the same time, made
it clear that the final shape of the Kosovo-Mace-
donian section of the border should be determi-
ned in talks between the Macedonian govern-
ment and UNMIK. Several months later, Alba-
nians were seriously annoyed by the EUÕs appro-
val of the preamble to Serbia and Montene-
groÕs constitution. After it was presented to the
public in early November 2002, KosovoÕs prime
minister, Bajram Rexhepi, stated that the draft
preamble was unacceptable to Kosovo Albanians
and threatened that if the EU approved it, the
Kosovo Parliament would probably pass a decla-
ration of independence. On 7 November 2002,
the parliament in Pristina passed a resolution
proclaiming the invalidity of Serbia and Monte-
negroÕs constitution preamble. This resolution,
in turn, was vetoed by Michael Steiner. When
Zoran Djindjic raised the issue of the cantonisa-
tion of Kosovo in January 2003, the AAK respon-
ded with a proposal for the Kosovo Parliament to
draft a declaration of independence. This con-
cept of the AAK won the support of a large gro-
up of PDK MPs. In the end, however, the Parlia-
mentÕs leaders decided under international pres-
sure not to start a debate on this issue, in spite
of AAKÕs protests. 
On the other hand, Hashim ThaciÕs moratorium
concept presented in April 2003 was an example
of a constructive (counter) offensive of the Alba-
nians, which had the support of the West. It pro-
vided that a specific date should be determined
for the start of talks on KosovoÕs final status,
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that any debates on this issue should be suspen-
ded until that date, and that efforts be concen-
trated on the development of democratic institu-
tions in Kosovo. The Serbian side, opposed to the
transfer of further competencies to local autho-
rities and other Albanian parties, disapproved of
ThaciÕs proposal40.
Albania is obviously the most earnest backer of
KosovoÕs independence aspirations. Since the
fall of communism, Tirana has been pursuing
a firmly pro-American foreign policy, hoping to
win US support for KosovoÕs independence. This
policy leads to tensions between Albania and
the EU. However, as the prospect of European in-
tegration for Albania remains vague, relations
with the US are of priority importance for Tira-
na. Authorities in Tirana compared with Alba-
nian elites from Kosovo are adopting a more mo-
derate position on the independence issue (e.g.
they accept the UNÕs line on the date on which
talks should commence) in order to avoid ten-
sions in their relations with Brussels and Wa-
shington, two major sources of financial assi-
stance for Albania, one of EuropeÕs poorest coun-
tries. Tirana supports KosovoÕs independence
aspirations mainly through the promotion of
mutual economic co-operation. The plan to build
a highway from Durres to Pristina, connecting
Kosovo with the Adriatic coast, is of key impor-
tance in this respect. The highway will restore
commercial links between these two regions
broken ninety years ago.
Kosovo vs. the international
c o m m u n i t y
The United States has played the most impor-
tant role in KosovoÕs recent history. In the mid
1990s, Washington determined that removing
Slobodan Milosevic from power was a necessary
prerequisite for the stabilisation of the Balkans.
The USÕs firm stand, combined with Belgra-
deÕs confrontational policy in the period of the
Kosovo crisis41, led to rapprochement in Ameri-
can-Albanian relations and strengthened the
firmly pro-American sentiments of AlbaniaÕs po-
litical elites42. Even after the toppling of Milose-
vic, when the American-Yugoslav relations were
improving, Albania had the best relations with
Washington of all countries in the region. These
relations improved further when Albania firmly
backed WashingtonÕs policy following the at-
tacks of 11 September 200143 and during the Ira-
qi crisis. Unlike Belgrade, Albanian political eli-
tes in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia backed
the US policy without reservations44. Today, the
United States, more than any other country, is
theoretically prepared to approve KosovoÕs inde-
pendence on certain conditions, though its sup-
port for this idea is rather moderate. Support for
this concept is mainly evident within the US
Congress. In the 1990s, Robert Dole, the leader
of the republican majority and a candidate in the
presidential elections of 1996, was an advocate
of KosovoÕs case. In June 2002 in the House of Re-
presentatives congressmen Tom Lantos and Ben
Gillman, both affiliated with the Albanian lobby
in the US, put forward a draft resolution calling
on Washington to back KosovoÕs independence.
In January 2003, Lantos and Henry Hyde, Chair-
man of the International Relations Committee of
the House of Representatives, proposed a new
draft, which differed from the original one in
that it made the formation of democratic institu-
tions in Kosovo and the inclusion of the EU in
this process a prerequisite for the recognition of
KosovoÕs independence (the previous draft reso-
lution only mentioned NATO and the United Na-
tions). In May 2003, Joseph Biden, Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, filed
a draft resolution calling for an independence re-
ferendum to be held in Kosovo.
However, none of the senior officials of the Pre-
sidentÕs Administration, the main author of Wa-
shingtonÕs foreign policy, ever officially backed
the idea of an independent Kosovo. [Former] US
President Bill Clinton did it only once, in a spe-
cial situation, i.e. during the 1999 bombings of
Yugoslavia, threatening Milosevic that Yugosla-
via might lose Kosovo forever. Presently, the Bal-
kans are no longer a region of priority for the
United States. The US is gradually withdrawing
from the Balkans, e.g. in 2002, it left the Monte-
negro issue to the determination of the EU. This
was particularly meaningful given the fact that,
unlike the EU, the United States had no serious
reservations concerning MontenegroÕs indepen-
dence. 
The European Union is believed to approach Ko-
s o v oÕ s independence aspirations with more
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scepticism than the United States45. The greatest
potential opponents of independence include
Greece, Belgium and France. The EUÕs fear of Ko-
sovoÕs uncontrollable independence aspirations
manifested itself in BrusselsÕ commitment to the
process of YugoslaviaÕs transformation into Ser-
bia and Montenegro. The EUÕs objective was to
prevent MontenegroÕs secession as that would
signify the end of Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo
remained an integral part. The federation of Ser-
bia and Montenegro was established largely due
to the strong pressure of Brussels, exerted in
particular on the weaker Montenegro. In March
2002, Belgrade and Podgorica reached a compro-
mise on a peaceful ÒdivorceÓ46. Montenegro agre-
ed to postpone discussions on the independence
referendum, initially until 2005, and then until
2006. The constitution of the new state includes
the provision that, if Montenegro secedes in
2006, Serbia will become YugoslaviaÕs successor.
T h e re is hope within the EU, to solve the Ko s o v o
p roblem by waiting until the AlbaniansÕ Òindepen-
dence feverÓ abates, then reintegrating Kosovo as
a t h i rd republic within a n e w, democratic and de-
eply decentralised Yugoslavia. Chances that this
scenario might succeed improved after Milosevic
was toppled in October 2000 and the democratic
opposition came to power in Belgrade.
The problem of KosovoÕs final status is very im-
portant for the process of integrating the Bal-
kans into Europe, as only independent states
may apply for membership in the EU. Brussels
wishes to prevent Kosovo from becoming a black
hole in the Balkans, due to its indeterminate sta-
tus, as the region integrates with the EU. The EU
plays an important role in the development of
Kosovo because, within UNMIK, the European
Union is responsible for the economic develop-
ment of the protectorate. For a long time, the EU
has been declaring readiness to take over UN pe-
ace missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Within the
framework of the Stabilisation and Association
Process (SAP), the objective of which to make
Balkan states to conclude association agre-
ements with the EU, Brussels is implementing
a strategy of parallel relations with Kosovo inde-
pendently of its relations with Belgrade. In order
to establish direct contacts with Pristina, the EU
opened a European Office within the UNMIK in
early 2002. In November 2002, a conference on
ÒKosovo in the SAPÓ was held in Brussels with
representatives of UNMIK and Kosovo authori-
ties. On 13 March a European envoy, UNMIK
Chief Michael Steiner and KosovoÕs prime mini-
ster Bajram Rexhepi met in Pristina for the first
time. This meeting marked the beginning of the
Òimplementation of co-ordination mechanisms
necessary for the functioning of the SAP monito-
ring mechanismÓ, i.e. the initiation of the Stabi-
lisation and Association Process47.
In the 1990s, BelgradeÕs most important patron
on the international scene was Russia, although
it treated Serbian interests largely as an instru-
ment of its policy towards the US and the EU.
RussiaÕs position was substantially undermined
by NATOÕs intervention in Kosovo carried out in
spite of MoscowÕs objections. Following Vladi-
mir PutinÕs rise to power, RussiaÕs policy towards
the Balkans became more pragmatic. Russia ca-
me to terms with reality (meaning the limits of
its potential), which manifested itself, for exam-
ple, in the insubstantial role it played during the
crises in Presevo Valley (2000Ð2001) and Mace-
donia (2001), and the withdrawal of all Russian
units from peace missions in Bosnia and Kosovo
in 2003. However, as regards Kosovo, support
extended by Russia to Belgrade still appears to
be stronger than the backing provided by the US
to Albanians.
The United Nations appears to be ready to ap-
prove KosovoÕs independence more than any
other organisation. In October 2000, the Inde-
pendent International Commission on Kosovo,
working under the auspices of the UN and cha-
ired by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson,
presented a report on the future of Kosovo pre-
pared for UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The
Commission decided that forcing Kosovo Alba-
nians to accept autonomy within Serbia or the
status of a third constituent republic of Yugosla-
via was unrealistic and immoral. It maintained
that the optimum solution would be conditional
independence for Kosovo Ð in order to obtain it,
Kosovo would be required to meet the criteria
defined by the UN in the ÒStandards Before Sta-
tusÓ strategy. Two months later, in December
2000, Kofi Annan proposed a plan to create
a confederation of three independent states Ð
Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro. This proposal
was met with very critical responses on the part
of the Serbs and relatively critical reactions on
the part of Kosovo Albanians48.
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Fo r e c a s t
Over the next few years, KosovoÕs autonomy will
be expanded further (e.g. it will become a rule
for the KosovoÕs prime minister and the head of
UNMIK to participate in international conferen-
ces). Elements of the EU legislation will be intro-
duced in Kosovo as part of the Stabilisation and
Association Process. These developments will
continue to breed tension between UNMIK and
Belgrade. Kosovo Albanians, on the other hand,
will demand talks on KosovoÕs final status more
pressingly (through demonstrations). This issue
will surely re-emerge in the context of the Euro-
pean integration process, when Serbia and Mon-
tenegro file applications for EU membership in
Brussels or when the time comes to decide on
the further fate of this state. 
As regards KosovoÕs final status, the most likely
scenario is that in 2005 the Security Council will
determine the date on which talks on this issue
will begin, subject to certain criteria being met.
At the same time, the EU will probably take over
UNMIKÕs competencies in the civil sphere and
the EU and NATO will establish joint command
over KFOR.
Reuters reported on 20 May 2003 that, accord i n g
to anonymous sources in the EU, Brussels is mo-
re than ever convinced that no stability in the re-
gion or the protectorate will be possible as long
as Ko s o v oÕ s status remains indeterminate. The
EU gradually admits that forcing Albanians to ac-
cept reintegration within Serbia and Montenegro
is unrealistic, even if the relations were asymme-
tric, i.e. if Kosovo enjoyed a b roader autonomy.
The new federation of Serbia, Montenegro and
Kosovo would be a dysfunctional state due to
permanent internal conflicts. On the other hand
the division of Kosovo into a Serbian and
Albanian part would be easy to implement only
for Mitro v i c a4 9. For this reason, the most pro b a-
ble scenario is that Kosovo may gain conditional
i n d e p e n d e n c e5 0. Following negotiations with the
UN Security Council, the European Union will
p robably take over the civil aspect of the pro t e c-
torate over Kosovo from the latter, leaving the
m i l i t a ry aspect to NAT O. An EU-appointed gover-
nor co-operating with the local government will
further expand the competencies of local autho-
rities, retaining control only over foreign and de-
fence policies. The governor, in co-o p e r a t i o n
with the local government, will also continue to
Ò E u ropeaniseÓ Ko s o v oÕ s l e g i s l a t i o n5 1. Some politi-
cians in Brussels may hope that the Òstick and
c a r rotÓ policy (integration with the EU and Ko s o-
v oÕ s dependence on Western financial assistan-
ce), the threat of complete international isolation
and awareness of NAT OÕ s m i l i t a ry power should
persuade Albanians to give up their independen-
ce aspirations. In order to implement this solu-
tion, KFOR would have to stay in Kosovo with
a relatively large number of troops and be trans-
formed into an occupying force pacifying any de-
monstrations organised by the Albanians. What
is more, one could not preclude the emergence of
t e r rorist organisations of disappointed radical Al-
banians targeting international forces. Ko s o-
v oÕ s p roblems could also be easily ÒexportedÓ to
Macedonia and the Presevo Va l l e y. 
Even if Albanians were successfully forced into
accepting the status of an EU protectorate, the
issue of independence would still re-emerge on
the occasion of each election. The EU would face
a difficult task explaining why Kosovo sho-
uldnÕt have the same rights as other states in the
region once the Balkans became stabilised and
integrated with the EU. On the other hand, if Ko-
sovoÕs independence was recognised, the protec-
torate would not end automatically: Bosnia and
Kosovo alike would remain under the supervi-
sion of Brussels and Washington for a few more
years, as a theoretically independent state. 
Talks on KosovoÕs final status will certainly invo-
lve the participation of the US, the EU, the Uni-
ted Nations, and perhaps also Russia. From the
point of view of AlbaniansÕ aspiration for inde-
pendence, the diplomatic commitment of the US
will be of crucial importance. The problem of Ko-
sovo is more serious than that of neighbouring
Montenegro. Albanians are the only predomi-
nantly Muslim nation in the world with firm
pro-American sentiments. Hence, Washington
will probably not leave the decision on Koso-
voÕs status to the EU. Because of foreign policy
differences within the EU, the commitment of
the United States will play a decisive role. The
scale of US activities in the Balkans will depend,
among other factors, on the situation in the Mid-
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dle East. If this region does not become political-
ly destabilised or, more so, if Washington mana-
ges to secure peace in the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, the US will probably take a decisive stand
on the issue of KosovoÕs final status, thus reaffir-
ming its position as a superpower. The materia-
lisation of any pessimistic scenarios for the Mid-
dle East, however, will mean that KosovoÕs sta-
tus may remain suspended for longer. Russia,
China and France because of their strong sup-
port for idea of invariability of borders and their
traditional distance toward ns. policy will proba-
bly have the greatest reservation towards Koso-
voÕs independence. However, this issue is not of
strategic importance in world politics. Therefo-
re, it can be assumed, taking into account, the
pragmatism of Beijing and Moscow, as well as
the lack of GermanyÕs support for partsÕ stance,
the above cited countries will not conduct an
uncompromising policy in the matter.
If the EU and the US choose to proceed towards
KosovoÕs independence in an evolutionary man-
ner, imposing certain conditions, it will be very
important to include Belgrade in the process.
International community is afraid that the inde-
pendence of Kosovo could harm proeuropean
orientation of Serbia. However, the position of
chauvinist forces is weaked. it is hardly possible
that the leaders coming from democratic oppo-
sition could keep being adamant as long as
KosovaÕs future is concerned since Serbia has a
perspective of integration with the EU. The most
important arguments that could persuade Bel-
grade to co-operate include: prospects for Ser-
biaÕs integration with the EU the development
of regional co-operation enabling Belgrade to re-
tain influence on the situation of Kosovo Serbs,
joining Mitrovica with Serbia and broad autono-
my for non-Albanians5 2. Independent Ko s o v o
will be forced to sign the international treaty
which will forever exclude the possibility of its
union with Albania.
A similar ÒcarrotÓ (integration with the EU) 
should also be offered to Bosnian Serbs. When
the question of KosovoÕs independence emerges,
the EU and the US will probably have to make
certain concessions to the Serbian Republic 
in Bosnia, offering guarantees that it retains its
autonomy within Bosnia and Herzegovina. After
Romania and Bulgaria (and perhaps also Croatia)
become EU and NATO members within the next
four years, Brussels will probably try to make
the remaining states of the region, i.e. Albania,
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and the Ko-
sovo protectorate, co-operate more closely, for-
ming a kind of regional mini EU. 
One of the most important conditions imposed
by the international community will certainly be
that KosovoÕs independence may be recognised
only if refugees are allowed to return. Theoreti-
cally, the prospect of independence offers the
best chances for the constructive involvement of
Albanians in this process. Presently, Serbian au-
thorities are threatening that, if Kosovo chooses
to push for independence, they will appeal to
Serbs living in Kosovo to leave the protectorate
on a mass scale and to stop the return of refuge-
es. This position may change, however, once Ser-
bia comes to terms with reality and realises that
the more Serbs return, the stronger its position
in Kosovo will be. Obviously, not all refugees will
return. According to the Council of EuropeÕs esti-
mates, approx. one third of refugees are not wil-
ling to do this. The scale of returns will depend
on whether the West makes returning financially
attractive. However, it is highly likely that most
of the refugees will not be interested in return-
ing to independent Kosovo. At least some Alba-
nians will be dissatisfied with any concessions
made to Kosovo Serbs over internal issues. Besi-
des, there will always be extremist Albanian gro-
ups calling for Kosovo to be cleansed of Serbs
and opposing any concessions being made to
Belgrade. A resolved stance of the West and the
prospect of independence should keep these in
a marginal position, however.
The greatest fear of the international communi-
ty is that KosovoÕs independence may rekindle
the AlbaniansÕ hopes of creating a Great Albania.
Albanian rebellions in the Presevo Valley and
Macedonia in 2001 justified apprehension con-
cerning the consequences that KosovoÕs inde-
pendence may have on regional stability. Particu-
larly vulnerable is the situation in Macedonia,
where the Albanian minority of nearly 500 tho-
usand accounts for approx. one quarter of the
population. The present situation in Macedonia
warrants moderate optimism Ð former rebellion
leaders are acting constructively, participating
in the government and approving the compro-
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mise peace agreement, which preserved the co-
untryÕs integrity and granted a broad autonomy
to Albanians. Nevertheless, it should be expec-
ted that any concessions to Kosovo Serbs would
encourage Macedonian Albanians to demand
a broader autonomy as well. On the other hand,
there will always be groups in Kosovo deman-
ding its unification with Albania. It is unlikely,
however, that they should garner a broader bac-
king Ð Albanians have to take into account the
position of the West on this issue. This traditio-
nal Albanian pragmatism stems from an aware-
ness of the nationÕs weakness and the need for
the support of a mighty patron, which is neces-
sary for the change in status quo . In the end, it
will be of key importance for the solution of the
Kosovo problem that the West adopt a firm and
resolved stance providing it with the ability to
impose its own solutions. However, it must first
develop an action plan for the region and shape
reality on this basis, rather than merely respon-
ding to current difficulties and observing the si-
tuation develop. 
Adam Balcer
1 It is extremely difficult to estimate the real size of Koso-
voÕspopulation and its ethnic structure. This problem is di-
scussed in the chapter on ÒThe Concept of a Multi-Ethnic
KosovoÓ. 
2 Numerous Serbian church monuments found in this re-
gion are a material symbol of the SerbsÕ historical claim on
Kosovo.
3 Equal representation on the federal level and permanent
borders.
4 Radical groups advocating the formation of Great Albania
had limited support. However, the concept to annex areas
inhabited by Albanian majorities beyond the borders of Ko-
sovo to the Republic of Kosovo enjoyed some popularity.
5 The constitution provided that any alteration of Yugosla-
viaÕsborders, e.g. secession of one of the republics, required
the consent of all federal units. Thus, even if Kosovo were
granted the status of a republic, this would not automati-
cally enable its secession. 
6 In October 1991, Albanian parties from Serbia, Kosovo,
Montenegro and Macedonia met in Pristina. At that me-
eting, a declaration was adopted stating that, in the event
of YugoslaviaÕs break-up and the alteration of the borders;
areas inhabited by Albanian majorities should have the 
right to join Albania (http://www.kosova.com Ð the page of
Qendra per informim e Kosoves Ð a news agency linked
with LDK).
7 The declaration of independence, recognised solely by Al-
bania and only in theory, was passed by the Kosovo Parlia-
ment previously dissolved by Milosevic.
8 In 1996, Ibrahim Rugova concluded an agreement with
Slobodan Milosevic under which cultural autonomy was to
be restored. The signing of this agreement in fact meant
that Kosovo gave up its independence aspirations. This
agreement was never fully executed.
9 Ac c o rding to re s e a rch carried out in August 1997 by the in-
dependent Serbian daily Nasa Borba and the Kosovo paper
Koha Ditore, 42 percent of Serbs opposed any form of auto-
nomy for the Albanians, even the autonomy that was in pla-
ce, and 40 percent were pre p a red to extend the existing au-
tonomy moderately in the cultural dimension only. Over 50
p e rcent of Albanians were ready to give up independence
aspirations and accept the pre-1989 autonomy, and an even
l a rger group was ready to accept the status of a Yugoslav re-
public (International Crisis Group, Kosovo Spring, 20 March
1998, pp. 45Ð46, http://www. c r i s i s w e b . o rg / p ro j e c t s / b a l-
kans/ko s o v o / re p o r t s / A 4 0 0 1 7 8 _ 2 0 0 3 1 9 9 8 . p d f ) .
10 The concept to divide Kosovo first emerged in the famo-
us 1986 memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences
and Arts (SANU). This concept was supported by Dobrica
Cosic, the mentor of this memorandum, a well-known wri-
ter and president of Yugoslavia in 1992Ð1993. The concept
of cantonisation had been authored by Serb historian Du-
san Batakovic, presently SerbiaÕsambassador to Greece. His
plan assumed that Kosovo would be divided into five can-
tons and that an Albanian-Serbian administration would be
established for the large cities. In February 1999, the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church presented this plan to the French Fo-
reign Affairs Ministry.
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11 The key point of contention was the stationing of inter-
national troops in Kosovo, any variant of which was oppo-
sed by Milosevic. On the other hand, in the course of nego-
tiations, the West imposed very stringent conditions on
which NATO forces could be stationed in Kosovo.
1 2 A p p rox. 850 thousand Kosovo Albanians were driven away
to the neighbouring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro,
a further several hundred thousand had to seek re f u g e in the
mountains and other inaccessible areas of Ko s o v o.
13 In the resolution, all UN member states ÒreaffirmsÓ their
support for the integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia, as
it is termed in the Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2, which in-
cludes a provision that the international administration is
supposed to secure KosovoÕs autonomy within Yugoslavia
in the transition period. In the Rambouillet final document,
the international community backs the sovereignty and in-
tegrity of Yugoslavia in accordance with the Helsinki Final
Act, and states that national communities in Kosovo should
not jeopardise YugoslaviaÕs sovereignty.
14 In March 2003, a representative of the Kosovo govern-
ment and a UNMIK representative signed a free trade agre-
ement with Macedonia (http://www.radio21.net Ð the inde-
pendent Albanian radio in Kosovo).
15 In May 2003, representatives of the local authorities and
the head of UNMIK were supposed to take part in NATO and
EU-organised conferences for the first time. However, Mi-
chael Steiner, the head of UNMIK, cancelled their participa-
tion after the Kosovo Parliament passed a resolution hono-
uring the people of Kosovo struggling for independence.
16 Official figures are not completely reliable because a lar-
ge portion of the unemployed work illegally.
17 In 2002, the parliament passed only two out of twenty
laws drafted by the government.
18 Most victims were activists of the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK), the formation of President Ibrahim Rugova
(http://www.kosova.com). 
19 Some sources quote a smaller number of refugees (200
thousand), while others claim it was higher (280 thousand).
International Crisis Group (ICG), Return to uncertainty: Ko-
sovoÕs internally displaced and return process, 13 Decem-
ber 2002, p. 1Ð2;
h t t p : / / w w w. c r i s i s w e b . o rg / p ro j e c t s / b a l k a n s / ko s o v o / re-
ports/A400851_13122002.pdf)
20 In Western countries, there are large groups of Albanians
who left Kosovo in the 1990sand to date have not acquired
citizenship of the countries where they are staying to date.
After 1999, they could not cast their votes in Kosovo elec-
tions abroad, unlike the Serbian refugees staying in Serbia.
Thousands of Serbs left Kosovo in the 1980s; in future, Bel-
grade may offer them Kosovo citizenship. Among Serbian
refugees from Kosovo and Serbs living in Kosovo there are
also Serbs from Croatia. In 1992-1995, during the war in Bo-
snia, thousands of Bosnians left Kosovo under Serbian pres-
sure.
21 In terms of ownership, the proportion of land owned by
non-Albanians, and Serbs in particular, is larger than the
proportion of non-Albanians in the entire population of Ko-
sovo. Albanians are a relatively young society. In terms of
the adult population, the percentage of Albanians will for
many years remain lower as compared to the entire popu-
lation. At the moment, approx. 1/4 of adult inhabitants of
Kosovo, including refugees, are non-Albanian. 
22 Most Serbs left Kosovo in three waves: during the bom-
bings of Yugoslavia, with the leaving Yugoslav army, and
during the first few weeks that followed the armyÕs with-
drawal. Migration to Serbia continues even today, however,
the number of returning refugees is greater than the num-
ber of those leaving. 
23 The division of Mitrovica shows how mini-enclaves form
within enclaves. In the northern, Serbian part of the city,
a portion of the pre-war Albanian population still lives in
compact settlements. Their situation is the same as that of
small Serbian enclaves in those parts of Kosovo where the
ethnic conflict is still in the hot phase.
24 The number of attacks against Serbs remained stable for
over a year, suggesting that, in part, this must have been
a planned action. Since the issue of KosovoÕs status remains
open, radical Albanian groups, including a portion of the
UCK, see cleansing Kosovo of as many Serbs as possible as
the best way to eliminate BelgradeÕsinfluence and to disco-
urage refugees from returning.
25 Michael Steiner, the head of UNMIK, blames this partly
on Belgrade because, in spite of the fact that a special agre-
ement was signed in August 2002, Belgrade has been post-
poning the solution of this problem and uniform registra-
tion plates have not been introduced throughout Kosovo to
date. 
2 6 G e n e r a l l y, the situation of non-Serbian ethnic groups, e.g.
Turks, Bosnians, Ashkalis, or Egyptians (in this order; the
latter two groups being of Roma origin), is much better than
the situation of Serbs and Romas. Pre s e n t l y, their political
elites support the independence aspirations of the Alba-
nians (OSCE, Reports, Situation of ethnic minorities in Ko s o-
v o, http://www. o s c e . o rg / ko s o v o / d o c u m e n t s / re p o r t s / m i n o r i-
t i e s / )
27 Albanians have raised objections regarding some of the
judges, claiming they had been at the authoritiesÕ disposal
at the times of Milosevic (www.kosovapress.com Ð website
of the Kosovo press news agency linked with the political
parties originating from the UCK).
28 The position of Albanians in negotiations was weaker
from the very beginning, because of the indeterminate sta-
tus and limited competencies. In addition, Belgrade was
not interested in treating KosovoÕs local authorities as equ-
al partners. 
29 Serbian MPs left the parliamentÕsmeetings each time any
issues relating to Ko s o v oÕ s independence or Yu g o s l a-
viaÕs sovereign rule over it were on the agenda. After the
parliament in Pristina passed the resolution declaring the
invalidity of the preamble of Serbia and MontenegroÕs con-
stitution that stated Kosovo was an autonomous province
of Serbia in November 2002, the Serbs boycotted the parlia-
mentÕs meetings for nearly four months. 
30 Under Resolution 1244, Kosovo remains an integral part
of Yugoslavia in the transition period. 
31 Krstic is opposed to cantonisation as the final solution.
However, he advocates the division of large cities into Alba-
nian and Serbian sections. Covic does not preclude cantoni-
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sation based on the model of the Muslim-Croatian Federa-
tion in Bosnia. As regards Mitrovica, it is assumed that se-
veral communes constituting one city district will be esta-
blished.
32 Der Spiegel, 11 January 2003.
33 DjindjicÕs position was also criticised by Yugoslav Presi-
dent Vojislav Kostunica. Many commentators believed that
DjindjicÕs sudden turn was intended to win popularity with
the nationalist part of the Serbian electorate.
34 This two-way policy of Serbia may be exemplified by the
decision taken four days later to end the boycott of the Ko-
sovo Parliament. 
3 5 It included the following provision: ÒIn case that someone
attempts to establish a new Albanian state within a part of
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, including Ko s o-
v o, the Union of Serb municipalities and municipal units in
Kosovo shall call the Government of Serbia and the bodies of
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to ensure full so-
v e reignty in the areas inhabited by Serb people for centu-
riesÓ. ICG, Kosovo Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for Civic Con-
tract, 28 May 2003, p. 20. http://www. c r i s i s w e b . o rg /
p ro j e c t s / b a l k a n s / ko s o v o / reports/A400983_28052003.pdf 
36 http://www.b92.net 
37 http://www.b92.net 
38 Michael Steiner disapproved of this resolution, but he ad-
mitted that its message had been partly mitigated in ke-
eping with his earlier objections (www.kosovalive.com Ð
the website of an independent news agency). 
3 9 The Albanian offensive in the Presevo Valley followed the
invitation of the Yugoslav President to the Stabilisation Pa c t
summit to which no Kosovo re p resentative had been invited. 
40 Veton Surroi, Fillimi i shekullit Ð prgjigje ndaj morato-
riumit t Hashim Tha÷it (Koha Ditore, 20 May 2003;
http://www.koha.net/read_kosove.asp?id=2664).
41 The solution of the Presevo Valley problem by Belgrade in
2001, shortly after Milosevic lost power, suggested that if
the methods of fighting Albanian guerrillas had been diffe -
rent (surgical operations of special units instead of pacifica-
tion of entire villages and massacres of civilians) and if Ser-
bia had been under a different kind of rule, the WestÕs poli-
cy towards Kosovo in 1999 would certainly have been diffe-
rent. 
42 After Milosevic remained in power following the entry of
KFOR into Kosovo, Americans unofficially supported the
operations of Albanian guerrillas in the Preseva Valley, in
a tactical scope.
43 Unlike in Albania, comments made in Serbia expressed
that the US had become a target of attacks because of its
expansive foreign policy. Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostu-
nica was one to voice such an opinion.
44 Another manifestation of this tendency was the agre-
ement concluded between Albania and Washington in May
2003, which guaranteed that American soldiers would not
be denounced to the International Criminal Court.
45 After the report of the Independent International Com-
mission on Kosovo (see below) was published in October
2000, proposing the conditional recognition of KosovoÕs in-
dependence, Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External
Relations, stated that the EUÕsposition on Kosovo was com-
pliant with Resolution 1244 and that the EU was not taking
a step furtherÓ, thus precluding KosovoÕs independence.
However, resolution 1244 theoretically precludes no option.
Following the parliamentary elections in November 2001,
when Rugova called for the recognition of KosovoÕs inde-
pendence, the head of the diplomacy of Belgium, at that ti -
me holding the EU presidency, once again declared that the
Fifteen was opposed to KosovoÕs independence. 
46 The EUÕs policy was facilitated by the fact that the idea
of maintaining ties with Belgrade was very popular in Mon-
tenegro.
47 After this meeting, Michael Steiner stated in apress con-
ference that Òthe standards required of Kosovo were identi-
cal to those imposed by the EU on other countries in the re-
gionÓ (www.radio2.net).
4 8 Albanian politicians have expressed either firm objection
against any retained ties with Serbia, or admitted that such
ties could be pre s e rved, simultaneously demanding that Ko-
s o v oÕ s independence first be recognised (http://www. u n m i-
ko n l i n e . o rg / p ress/lmm00.htm Ð a review of the Kosovo pre s s
on the official UNMIK website).
49 For example, the issue of the incorporation of the Alba-
nian part of Kosovo into Albania would emerge. The most
controversial region would be the Gjilan/Gnjilane enclave
near the Serbian border. On the Serbian side, it borders the
Presevo Valley inhabited predominantly by Albanians.
50 According to Reuters (20 May 2003), more and more EU
officials admit that the most realistic final solution for Ko-
sovo would be conditional independence.
51 Within the EU, Kosovo would have identical rights to
those of the other members but, formally, it would be the
EUÕs protectorate. 
52 Deep decentralisation is of key importance. Possible con-
cessions to Serbs should include changes to commune bor-
ders along ethnic lines.
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